

















There are high economic expectations concerning the emergence of Big Data: a 
promised golden age for both consumers and firms. Digital technology allows firms 
to provide digital services in exchange of personal data, from which they can fine-
tune their supply to better match market demand. By extending Arrow (1962)'s 
analysis of the market for information to the phenomenon of Big Data, we propose a 
theoretical assessment of its potential effects on productivity growth. Our study 
highlights that Big Data modify the market for information by introducing new 
informational products which are not public goods. This characteristic is crucial as it 
implies that private production of personal-data based information can be 
profitable. This profitability gives digital firms the incentive to produce information 
likely to improve firm-level productivity and consumer welfare. Finally, we conclude 
that the productivity effect of Big Data at the macroeconomic level is conditional on 
both the production and diffusion of this personal-data based information. 
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Introduction 
The volume of data created every year in the world started to increase sharply with 
the arrival of the personal computer but has stepped up considerably the pace with 
the Internet, the sensor and the mobile phone (Lyman and Varian 2003). This 
proliferation of data has been made possible by three technological innovations: 
processing, storage, and information and communication technologies. These 
innovations have changed our professional and free time activities in a convergent 
way. Most of our acts now proceed through screens and hard disks in white- and 
blue-collar jobs as well as in our recreational moments. These new work and playful 
tools are also new media through which all our acts are inexorably “dataficated”. 
Digitalization necessarily implies the production of data in unprecedented quantity, 
systematically stored in the new magnetic and optical media. This massive creation 
of digital footprints is not only stored at low cost but also cheaply transmitted 
electronically through communication technology (telephone, radio and TV, and 
the Internet). The “datafication” of almost everything, the rapid electronic 
transmission and the interconnection of all these data characterize this 
technological phenomenon called “Big Data”.1 
 There are high expectations of Big Data in science, public administration and, 
particularly, in business2. Some consider data as a new raw material or even a new 
class of assets, i.e. goods capable of generating and storing economic value (The 
Economist (2010) and Schwab (2011)). Many expect lower prices for consumers 
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thank to ubiquitous competition, better-informed decisions for enterprises thank to 
data analysis, and more income growth and jobs at the macroeconomic level thank 
to higher productive efficiency. 
 Are these high expectations misplaced? Will Big Data deliver its promise of 
productivity growth? This paper attempts to answer these questions by extending the 
theoretical analysis of the market for information by Arrow (1962) to the Big Data 
phenomenon. What do Big Data change to the market for information? Our 
theoretical exploration concludes that Big Data modify this market by allowing 
digital firms to make profits by extracting valuable information from personal data 
that consumers accept to transfer in exchange of the use of a free or paid digital 
service. Data protection laws prohibit passing on personal data to the public arena. 
This legal bulwark against privacy violations not only protects the users of the Internet 
and other digital networks but also safeguards the digital firms' profits. Privacy indeed 
prevents personal information from becoming a public good as information in 
general. This protection against the public diffusion of personal information is thus the 
guarantee for digital firms to appropriate the economic value they create from our 
personal data. If personal information were not protected, it would diffuse easily and 
costless as any other type of information and producers of information would not 
make any profit. Big Data are therefore a game-changing technological innovation 
in the market for information. By making possible to capture profit from the 
production of information, Big Data provide digital firms with big incentives to 
produce new market information based on personal data. The quality of market 
information should increase and so does corporate efficiency thank to better-
informed management. However, most firms will have to pay for such personal-data 
based information or live without it. At the macroeconomic level, data-based 
management of firms should lift up aggregate productivity provided that the 
production of personal-data based market information is not durably monopolized 
by a handful of digital giants. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides definitions of data, 
information and Big Data. Section 3 explains the characteristics of the market for 
information. Section 4 presents what the emergence of Big Data change to the 
market for information. Section 5 deals with the potential macroeconomic effects of 
Big Data. Section 6 concludes. 
 
Data, Information and Big Data 
This section aims at providing definitions of data, information and Big Data. We all 
use these concepts without precisely knowing what they mean. This is often the case 
with intangible goods. Data and information are no exceptions. In this paper, we will 
use the following definitions: 
 What are data? Data can be defined as distinguishable variables with no 
meaning per se. Floridi (2010) talks about data as “lacks of uniformity” in the real 
world, between two signals or two symbols. He takes the example of a red light 
against a dark background. This is a datum in the “real world” breaking uniformity 
with the dark background without a self-imposing intelligibility. Silence amidst the 
noise is also a datum as lack of uniformity. 
 What is information? Anyone with no computer knowledge looking at a computer 
programme may find it meaningless or unintelligible. Yet data in the computer 
programme are assembled by its designer to be meaningful. Data become 
informative when data in our environment produce a meaningful signal or when we 
associate a semantic content to these data (Floridi 2010). In other words, information 










accumulation of information. In the terminology of Floridi (2010), knowledge builds 
up from factual semantic information, which implies that the semantic content 
associated to data has proved to be true. 
 What are Big Data? There are countless definitions of Big Data and most of them 
stress the size and the exponential growth of data we have been observing in the 
recent past. Floridi (2012) points out the tautology in defining Big Data by their size. 
Nevertheless, the high volume of production is indisputably a characteristic of Big 
Data. Two other characteristics are generally put forward (Laney 2001): high velocity 
of data production but also of data expiration; and variety of data (structured, 
unstructured, text and multimedia data). This 3V's definition of Big Data is not 
operational for our theoretical analysis. In this paper, we will define Big Data as 
mainly the production of personal data and information. This characteristic 
distinguishes data and information before and after the digital technology. Digital 
technology provides a technical way to offer services at a distance, which requires 
the transfer and storage of personal data to connect people and connect people 
with goods and services. By using these digital services, we leave additional digital 
footprints of our personality. Anytime we use a digital media, we tacitly accept to 
transfer personal data on a server, which raises major heatedly debated privacy 
concerns (Solove 2004).  The massive production of personal data resulting from the 
use of digital services characterizes the singularity and the novelty of the era of Big 
Data. 
 
The Economic Value of Information 
Conditions for a Social Welfare Optimum in a Market Economy 
General equilibrium theory - the framework of neoclassical economics - provides the 
conditions under which a society can achieve a social welfare optimum when 
supply, demand and price levels are determined without centralized decision-
making (Arrow and Hahn (1971) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). Among these 
conditions, perfect competition is the most well-known. There are three generally 
observed reasons why perfect competition fails to achieve a socially optimal 
allocation of resources: indivisibilities, inappropriability and uncertainty. Indivisibilities 
occur when it is not profitable to produce goods under a minimum scale due to 
fixed costs. When this happens, free entry of new enterprises in such a market - a 
condition for perfect competition - fails and the resource allocation is nonoptimal. 
Inappropriability describes the situation in which profits from the private production 
of a good cannot be fully captured by the producer. Public goods are subject to this 
failure because several people can consume the good at the same time (non-
rivalry) and because it is difficult to prevent those people from consuming the good 
without producing it themselves (non-excludability). An example of such a good is 
information, which can be costly to produce, used by its producer and some others 
simultaneously, and arduous or even impossible to avert its disclosure. There is thus no 
incentive for any private production of this good and the resource allocation under 
perfect competition is inevitably nonoptimal. Uncertainty refers to incomplete 
information. Information may be incomplete because existing information is known 
to some and unknown to others (asymmetric information) or because not yet existing 
information is unknown to all (future information). When uncertainty is introduced in 
the general equilibrium framework, the socially optimal resource allocation gives 
way because individual preferences are assumed to have a concave form (i.e., 
people enjoy consuming more of a good but grow weary of it each time they 
consume an additional quantity). In an uncertain environment, the concavity 










that they will invest less in risky activities than the social optimum requires. Although 
they could buy contracts to be insured against these risks, they could not do it for 
any type of risk because the insurance market is incomplete due to moral hazard. 
 
Information Market: Optimal Use and Nonoptimal Production of 
Information 
In a celebrated paper, the American economist Arrow (1962) explains why these 
three motives - indivisibilities, inappropriability and uncertainty - create a market for 
information whose production is socially nonoptimal. First, he argues that uncertainty 
creates an economic value for information. When information is incomplete 
because existing information is not known to everybody, the utility or profits of the 
individuals who do not possess such information may be negatively affected due to 
uninformed decisions. Knowing such information reduces uncertainty and increases 
these individuals' welfare by replacing uninformed by well-informed decisions. This 
economic value of information gives rise to a market for existing information, in 
which individuals who ignore a piece of information are willing to acquire it from 
individuals who know it. Optimality of allocation requires that the price of this piece 
of information equals its marginal cost, i.e. its diffusion cost since the product on sale 
is existing information. Nowadays, the diffusion technology is universal, fast and 
cheap thank to our modern information and communication technology. Therefore, 
the marginal cost should be close to zero. Can marginal cost pricing be applied to 
the market for existing information? It cannot because of indivisibilities and 
inappropriability, two reasons at the origin of nonoptimal allocation of resources. This 
is the second point of Arrow. Information is an indivisible commodity. Either one 
knows it or does not. Moreover, as already mentioned, information is a non-rival 
commodity which can be diffused easily and at low cost. The owner of the piece of 
information has therefore no incentive to sell it and may prefer to keep it for herself. 
Nevertheless, information is also hardly excludable, which implies that any 
information, as soon as it is used, has a high probability of leaking and becoming 
public. This is good news for the optimality of use of information. Although 
indivisibilities and inappropriability are obstacles to optimal allocation of resources 
through marginal cost pricing, inappropriability leads to the social optimum all the 
same thank to the non-excludability of information and the cheap cost of its 
diffusion technology. This reduces the incompleteness of information for all and 
increases social welfare thank to more well-informed decisions. 
 However, what is a virtue for the use of information is a vice for the production of 
information. In his third point, Arrow explains that inappropriability, which pushes 
prices down to zero, now is a serious brake to the production of knowledge, i.e. the 
production of information or new ideas. On the market for existing information, the 
cost is limited to the cost of diffusion. On the market for the production of 
information, the cost includes not only the diffusion cost but also the cost of research 
to produce new information. Moreover, this production is an uncertain process. 
There is no guarantee that research will yield useful and profitable knowledge. If the 
producer of information has no guarantee to retain the benefits of its costly and 
successful research, he will never allocate resources to research in the first place. 
Arrow concludes that indivisibilities, inappropriability and uncertainty lead to a 












What do Big Data Change to the Market for Information? 
 
Less Asymmetric Information 
Digital technology brings about change in the market for existing information in two 
respects: the acquisition and the storage of personal data. Personal information is 
protected by privacy and data protection laws in many countries in the world and 
cannot be legally made public. Governments possess a part of our personal data 
called administrative data. Every individual must by law provide the administration 
with her personal data to fulfil her citizen's duties (tax payments for instance) and to 
enjoy civil rights as well as social benefits. These data, which used to be stored on 
printed paper, now are stored on hard disks. They remain confidential as in the past 
due to data protection laws. Individuals and firms cannot have a legal access to 
these data. However, digital technology has developed a legal access to our 
personal data. Each visit of a website and every bit of information uploaded on 
social media generate digital data about us that can be used by the private owners 
of these websites to learn more about our preferences, habits and resources. Every 
time we make a click while browsing the Internet, we voluntarily accept to transfer 
confidential personal data to the private entities we pay a virtual visit. These data 
are protected by data protection laws to some extent so that private entities cannot 
make them public. In other words, by using the Internet, individuals freely give 
private entities access to personal data to an unprecedented scale in history. 
 Big Data, defined as the systematic digital storage of personal data, provide 
private firms with large quantities of personal data, which can be converted into 
information about individuals' tastes and budget constraints. Big Data thus modify 
the market for existing information in two ways. First, they provide enormous existing 
information on individuals which was not available before digital technology. 
Second, thank to the universality of the Internet use, Big Data provide statistical 
conditions to build personal information from personal data with a level of accuracy 
unknown before. Moreover, it allows for correcting or updating this information on a 
continuous basis. In other words, Big Data provide technical tools to reveal existing 
information on individuals. If enterprises master these technical tools, they can 
reduce asymmetric information on their market, make better-informed decisions and 
match their customers' needs more precisely. 
 
Personal Information Is Not a Public Good 
The fundamental changes Big Data introduce in the market for information is on the 
production of information. First, digital technology allows the creation of two new 
informational products: personal information and personal-data based market 
information. By accumulating data transferred by digital users, digital firms can 
produce personal information for each of their customers. As already mentioned, 
the value of that information comes from the reduction in asymmetric information. If 
all digital firms are able to produce personal information on their customers, many 
less can aggregate it to produce statistically reliable information on market demand 
and supply and capture real-time changes in both sides of the market. Obviously, 
the larger the audience of digital firms, the more accurate the inferred market 
information, and the higher the value of this informational product. Therefore, the 
economic value of personal-data based market information will be dependent on 
the audience of users. As explained in the previous section, information is an 
indivisible good: it is accurate or it isn't. Therefore, only the market information 










for example, will never charge for the use of their web sites since their economic 
value relies on the size of their audience. 
 The second fundamental change - by far, the most important one - concerns the 
profitability of the private production of these two new informational goods. Arrow 
(1962) showed that information as a public good could not yield a sufficient return to 
cover the investment cost of its producer. But the two new informational products 
introduced by the Big Data phenomenon are not public goods. The first one - 
personal information - cannot be a public good, in principle, because the diffusion 
of personal data is prohibited by law. The second one - personal-data based market 
information - can in effect diffuse more easily but its economic value is generally 
short-lived, especially on financial markets, demand-specific or only materializes in 
association with other pieces of information. Therefore, in a competitive 
environment, the expiration velocity and the difficulty to extract value from 
continuous flows of market information create incentives for firms to purchase real-
time information and market knowledge from digital giants. Thus, thank to protected 
personal data, private producers of personal-data based information can 
confidently capture the returns on their investment. As a result, the market for 
information based on personal data escapes the incentive trap which characterizes 
the market for general information. 
 
Will Big Data Deliver its Promised Productivity Growth? 
As mentioned earlier, Arrow (1962) concluded that the market for information as a 
public good would lead to a suboptimal investment in the production of knowledge, 
hence yielding lower productivity growth than its optimal trend. In order to correct 
this market failure in the information market, Arrow advocated for a legal framework 
protecting the economic return of information producers by granting them 
intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights) while fostering unlimited fair 
competition in the market for tangible goods and services. The competition policy 
framework in the western world has relied on the recognition of these two 
dimensions of many products: the idea and the physical product. Competition is the 
rule for the production of the physical good or service by any enterprise abiding by 
the patents and copyrights while the producer of the idea benefits from an 
exception to this rule by receiving a guaranteed return to his invention. This 
regulation system is not perfect but has found a subtle balance to provide the right 
incentives to inventors (producers of knowledge) and maximize social welfare 
through competitive prices on the market of physical products. How does digital 
technology modify this balance? 
 On the consumer side, information and communication technology transforms 
any consumer into an online ubiquitous consumer. Prior to the Internet, price 
comparison was a costly and time-consuming activity. Nowadays, any web shopper 
can easily compare prices of a good he wants to buy before the purchase. This 
transparency of the market supply has inevitably increased competition and, hence, 
lowered prices. In this respect, social welfare has increased without destabilizing the 
competition regulatory balance. 
 On the producer side, digital technology has two main effects. First, it transforms 
tangible products into intangible ones. The most famous example is the music 
industry. All of a sudden, the physical dimension of a musical record vanished, 
transforming a rival and excludable good into a non-rival and non-excludable one. 
Artists and music corporations lost the actual property of the returns of their 
productions. In fact, digitalization of tangible goods and services in an increasing 










record labels have not disappeared but their revenues have decreased substantially 
on average despite a record demand for now very affordable music listening. 
 However, the producers have taken their revenge on the consumers by collecting 
and storing personal data of the frenetic web consumers. This is the second effect of 
digital technology on the production side: the emergence of Big Data.  As explained 
in the previous section, Big Data does not eliminate market uncertainty for firms but 
reduces some of it. Some of the uninformed decisions that enterprises used to make 
amid the absence of information or based on biased scattered information should 
now be made based on market information statistically built from Big Data. The 
management of enterprises can therefore rely more on statistical personal-data 
based information rather than on uncertain anecdotal information or on the 
subjectivity of their managers. On average, productivity of firms should thus increase. 
The competition regulatory balance is shattered by the two effects of digitalization 
on the supply side. By eliminating the physical dimension of some goods and 
services, digital technology threatens the profitability of private production of the 
digitalized goods. In the past, competition authorities had to regulate producers to 
the benefit of consumers. Nowadays, consumers should be regulated to make sure 
that producers get even a slight return of their production. The second effect of 
digital technology - the emergence of Big Data - re-balances the information market 
in favour of the producers, which is good news for the industries experiencing the 
digital transition of their production. However, Big Data do not solve the issue, 
highlighted by Arrow, of the incompatibility between the optimal production of 
information and the optimal use of information.  Market power just changed sides 
from the users to the producers. Therefore, the macroeconomic effect of Big Data is 
uncertain. The competition policy framework will have to find a new subtle balance 
between the incentives for information production and its widest possible diffusion 
before privacy engineering technology eliminates the access to our personal data 
for all digital companies, i.e. the source of their market power.3 
 
Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to propose an assessment of the potential effects of Big 
Data on aggregate productivity. Our main conclusions are threefold. First, we 
emphasize that Big Data provide digital firms with personal data as raw materials to 
produce personal information likely to improve firms' management decisions and 
better match their customers' needs. Second, data protection laws safeguard both 
the digital users' privacy and the digital firms' profit. If personal data were not 
protected, digital users would not trust digital firms and, consequently, would stop 
using their digital services to avoid transferring their personal data. It is in the interest 
of digital firms not to diffuse personal data because it is a condition for getting users, 
producing personal information and selling personal-data based information at a 
profitable price. This legal protection of privacy implies that personal information is 
not a public good. This is the reason why private production of information based on 
personal data can be profitable unlike general information which can diffused easily 
and costless. Finally, we argue that Big Data should benefit all firms by reducing 
asymmetric information. However, the effect on the economy-wide productivity 
growth will depend on the level of competition prevailing in the production of 
personal-data based information. If competition is too high, prices will be low and 
digital firms will have no incentive to produce information. If competition is too weak, 
prices will be high and many firms will not be able to afford acquiring such 
                                               










information. Big Data's promised productivity growth is therefore conditional on the 
production level and quality as well as the wide diffusion of this personal-data based 
information. If privacy engineering technology happened to succeed in ringfencing 
the access to our personal data for any digital service provider, the production and 
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